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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
arising under local or special provisions of the State Constitu-
tion. In Shannon v. Morgan City Harbor & Terminal District23
it was held that a constitutional amendment specifically provid-
ing for the creation of the harbor district and authorizing the
issuance of bonds without a vote of the property owners in the
district superseded all other general provisions of the Constitu-
tion relative to the issuance of bonds. In Short & Murrell v. De-
partment of Highways2 4 it was held that the power of the Board
of Highways "to establish, construct, extend, improve, maintain
and regulate the use of the State highways and bridges," 25 auth-
orized it to direct the Highway Department to enter into con-
tracts looking toward the construction of a proposed office build-
ing to house the departmental activities. In Ewell v. Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University,26 the court held that
to the extent that sums collected for licenses, fees, and penalties
under the provisions of fertilizer,27 feed,2 8 and pesticide29 stat-
utes exceeded the cost of administering these measures, the stat-
utes were to be regarded as revenue levies. As a consequnce, it
was proper for the University, to whom the excess revenue was
dedicated, to bond the revenue and use the sums thus acquired for
the purpose of constructing a building to house the activities of




OFFICERS AND OTHER PERSONNEL
The officers of the Town of Mansura were elected for a two-
year term on June 12, 1956. At the same time the electorate of
the town voted to have their municipal affairs regulated in the
future by the Lawrason Act.' Under the pertinent provision of
this statute, officers of a municipality in office when it elects
to come under the provisions of the Lawrason Act retain their
23. 234 La. 1035, 102 So.2d 446 (1958).
24. 233 La. 735, 98 So.2d 170 (1957).
25. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 19.1.
26. 234 La. 419, 100 So.2d 221 (1958).
27. LA. R.S. 3:1311 et seq. (1950).
28. Id. 3:1891 et seq.
29. Id. 3:1601 et seq.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 33:321 et seq. (1950).
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offices until the first general municipal elections held in accord-
ance with the provisions of the statute.2 The next general mu-
nicipal elections were held, under the Lawrason Act, in June of
1957, but no municipal election was called or held in Mansura.
As a result the Attorney General ruled that these municipal of-
fices were vacant, and the Governor appointed the then incum-
bents for another term. In State ex rel. Lemoine v. Municipal
Democratic Executive Committee3 six electors of the municipal-
ity sought to mandamus the defendant committee to call a mu-
nicipal election on June 12, 1958. The trial judge agreed with
the relators' contention that the terms of the officers appointed
by the Governor expired on July 1, 1958, and issued the man-
damus. Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
reversed. The provisions of another section of the Lawrason
Act,4 apparently not considered by the trial court, provided that
municipal officers are elected for four-year terms. The terms of
the municipal offices in question would not expire until July 1,
1961.
Slicho v. New Orleans5 is a decision of far-reaching impor-
tance to the local government law of the state. The plaintiff
therein, a detective on the police force of the defendant city,
sought injunctive relief to prevent his discharge because of his
refusal to answer questions, on the ground that he might incrim-
inate himself, asked by the Intelligence Division of the Internal
Revenue Service. The plaintiff also sought a declaratory judg-
ment holding unconstitutional a section of the Constitution of
Louisiana 6 providing that such conduct was sufficient grounds
for his discharge, pleading its violation of the due process clause
of. the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff as
prayed for. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issues
were under the exclusive cognizance of the Civil Service Com-
mission of the City of New Orleans, and that the courts were
without jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.
In support of its position, the Supreme Court pointed out
that any civil servant of the city aggrieved by an act of his ap-
2. LA. R.S. 33:383 (1950).
3. 234 La. 969, 102 So.2d 234 (1958).
4. LA. R.S. 33:383 (1950).
5. 235 La. 305, 103 So.2d 454 (1958). This case was consolidated for trial
and argument on appeal with Vairin v. New Orleans, 235 La. 313, 103 So.2d 457
(1958).
6. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.
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pointing authority may take his complaint to the Civil Service
Commission, which is given exclusive jurisdiction to hear it. The
trial court had concluded that the pertinent section of the State
Constitution 7 granted to the Commission the exclusive right to
hear "appeals"; and that since this was a suit for a declaratory
judgment it did not constitute any appeal from disciplinary
action taken by the appointing authority. The appellate court
swept this contention aside with the following language:
"The word 'appeal' as used in the constitutional amend-
ment is not intended to signify a review by a judicial body of
the action taken by another judicial body; it is used in the
sense that the commissions are established tribunals wherein
all civil servants must file their complaints, the hearing be-
fore the appropriate commission being the first adversary
proceeding of a judicial nature available to the complainant." S
The fourth case in this area of local government law involved
only an issue of fact.9
In Klump v. Board of Trustees, ° the widow of a former cap-
tain in the New Orleans Fire Department, alleging that her hus-
band died in the performance of his official duties, sued to re-
cover a pension. Prior to trial of the case, the plaintiff died, and
her heirs were substituted as parties plaintiff, and the demand
was reduced to the amount which would have been due the orig-
inal plaintiff prior to her death. The trial court dismissed the
suit, and held: (1) the action had not abated on the death of the
plaintiff, insofar as the pension which might have accrued prior
to her death was concerned; and (2) the deceased died of nat-
ural causes.
The Supreme Court affirmed on the second point decided by
the trial court, and refused to consider the issue of abatement of
the action. After a study of the legislative history of the perti-
nent statute, through a careful analysis of its various amend-
ments and source provisions, the court concluded that a widow
was not entitled to a pension unless her husband died in the per-
formance of his duties as a result of an accident. The deceased
admittedly died of a heart attack, and since he sustained the
7. Ibid.
8. 103 So.2d at 457.
9. Mayerhafer v. Department of Police of the City of New Orleans, 104 So.2d
163: (La. 1958). There, the Supreme Court, with one Justice dissenting, reversed
the action Of the Civil Service Commission which upheld the discharge of the plain-
tiff police captain.
10. 234 La. 665, 101 So.2d 195 (1958).
[Vol. XlX
PUBLIC LAW
fatal attack after the performance of light and non-strenuous
duties, the appellate court agreed with the court below that he
died from natural causes, and not as a result of an accident. A
prior decision invoked by the plaintiffs was differentiated on the
ground that there the fireman had died as a result of a heart at-
tack superinduced by strenuous and violent physical activities
while fighting a fire.
FINANCE
The plaintiffs in Bell v. Shreveport" sought a judgment an-
nulling an ordinance imposing assessments on abutting property
to cover a portion of the costs of street paving. In accordance
with the authorizing statutory provisions, the city council gave
public notice of its intention to pave a portion of one of its
streets, the work to be done under competitive bidding, with two-
thirds of the cost thereof to be assessed against the abutting
property. Subsequently, the city council approved plans and
specifications for the work prepared by the city engineer, and
ordered that bids be received for the work to be done in accord-
ance therewith. The lowest bid submitted was accepted, the work
was completed, and by ordinance two-thirds of the total cost was
assessed against the abutting property.
The six plaintiffs, owners of abutting property affected, as-
serted the nullity of the assessment ordinance on the ground that
the paving contract was illegal. It was contended that the stat-
ute under which the work was done and the assessments levied
required acceptance of a contract based on a "turnkey job," while
the council had accepted a contract based on a "unit price" bid.
As a result, the plaintiffs asserted, the total cost of the work had
exceeded the bid price by $14,369.
. A judgment dismissing the suit was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Both trial and appellate courts held that the basis of com-
petition between the bidders was not in the estimate of total
costs submitted, but rather in the unit price bids offered. It was
found that the items which made up the difference between the
total cost and the estimated total bid price accepted consisted of
minor and immaterial alterations in the work as it progressed,
made necessary because of certain obstacles and conditions en-
countered which had not been foreseen.
11. 234 La. 607, 100 So.2d 883 (1958).
1959]
